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Abstract— A wash trade refers to the illegal activities of
traders who utilize carefully designed limit orders to manually
increase the trading volumes for creating a false impression of
an active market. As one of the primary formats of market
abuse, a wash trade can be extremely damaging to the proper
functioning and integrity of capital markets. The existing
work focuses on collusive clique detections based on certain
assumptions of trading behaviors. Effective approaches for
analyzing and detecting wash trade in a real-life market have
yet to be developed. This paper analyzes and conceptualizes the
basic structures of the trading collusion in a wash trade by using
a directed graph of traders. A novel method is then proposed to
detect the potential wash trade activities involved in a financial
instrument by first recognizing the suspiciously matched orders
and then further identifying the collusions among the traders
who submit such orders. Both steps are formulated as a
simplified form of the knapsack problem, which can be solved
by dynamic programming approaches. The proposed approach
is evaluated on seven stock data sets from the NASDAQ and the
London Stock Exchange. The experimental results show that
the proposed approach can effectively detect all primary wash
trade scenarios across the selected data sets.
Index Terms— Directed graph, dynamic programming,
market abuse, wash trade.
I. INTRODUCTION
SURVEILLANCE of a financial exchange market forpreventing market abuse activities has been attracting
significant academic and industrial attention after the financial
crisis in 2008 and especially since the flash crash in 2010. The
abuse of financial markets can occur in a variety of ways, all
of which can be extremely damaging to the proper functioning
and integrity of the market. Trade-based manipulation, where
the manipulation tactic is carried out only by simply buying
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and selling [1], is one of the primary forms. Price and
volume are usually two major objects to be manipulated, and
the former format, price manipulation, is thoroughly studied
in [2]–[6]. Another format of trade-based abuse is volume
manipulation, the manipulation actions intending to increase
the transaction volume for the purpose of giving a false
impression of high trading volume on the market [1], [7].
The major form of volume manipulation is wash trade, which
occurs when the same individuals or a group of collusive
clients are on both sell and buy sides of a financial instrument
(i.e., stock) trading. While there is no beneficial change in
ownership, wash trading has the effect of creating a misleading
appearance of an active interest in the stock [8].
A wash trade usually does not contain any illegal actions,
such as financial rumor spreading and market resource squeez-
ing, but it is carried out only by legitimate trading activities.
With carefully designed buy and sell order sequences, manipu-
lators can make the transaction follow their expectation. In the
wash trade tactics, a series of orders is often submitted as a
number of order pairs. The monitoring of any single leg of one
pair or part of a pair would not be concluded as collusive trad-
ing. Most of the existing related literature studies the collusive
cliques according to the activity similarity, which is defined
under certain assumptions. Very few address the quantitative
analysis of the features of different wash trade scenarios and
the corresponding detection approaches. This paper follows on
from our previous work on the trade-based manipulation [2]
and proposes a detection approach that considers a complete
spectrum of the wash trade detection. The main contributions
of this paper are as follows. The problem of wash trade is
thoroughly discussed, including the analysis of all possible
scenarios, from which the key features are extracted and
quantified. This provides a clear problem formulation and
explains the significance of exploring the conceptual models.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first theoretical study
of wash trade market manipulation. A two-step algorithm is
proposed to detect wash trade activities. The proposed two
steps, which consist of discovering the matching orders and
further recognizing the collusions, are both formulated as a
combinatorial optimization problem and solved by one unified
algorithm. The extensive experiments have been conducted on
real data from both USA and U.K. markets for testing the
practicability of the proposed wash trade detection method
in real life.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides a review of wash trade manipulation
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TABLE I
LIMIT ORDER SEQUENCES
and the corresponding detection methods. The features of
all types of wash trade scenarios as well as the proposed
detection approach are analyzed, formulated, and characterized
in Section III. The performance evaluation of the proposed
approach is provided in Section IV. Finally, Section V con-
cludes the paper and discusses potential improvements and
future work.
II. WASH TRADE AND ITS DETECTION
A. Wash Trade
In capital markets, limit orders indicate the trading intention
of the trader to buy or sell the volumes of a specific equity at a
specific price or better [9] (better price refers to higher selling
prices or lower buying prices). The transaction occurs when
eligible orders meet order-matching rules. The outstanding
unmatched limit orders are recorded in the order of books of
the exchange market, in which the highest buying price decides
the best bid price while the lowest selling price is the best ask
price. The gap between the best bid and the ask price is defined
as bid–ask spread [10]. In most of the exchange markets, the
matching rule selects the earliest order with the matched price
for execution. In the following examples in Table I, three limit
orders, #01, #02, and #03, are submitted in sequence to the
exchange market. According to the matching rule, order #03
is first executed by 300 shares with #01, which has the same
price but is earlier than order #02, and then, the remaining
100 shares are executed with #02.
Wash trades follow the same matching rules as legitimate
transactions with the special feature defined as the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) as no change in beneficial interest
or market risk, or the transfer of beneficial interest or market
risk only between parties acting in concert or collision, other
than for legitimate reasons [11]. The Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR) further indicates that a wash
trade is the deliberate arrangement in concert or collusion [12].
On August 28, 2014, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
released a new rule [adopted by U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC)], termed Rule 575 [13]. Rule
575 clearly states that no person shall enter messages to the
market as prearranged collusion (wash trade) with intent to
mislead other participants. The definition in Rule 575 in the
U.S. shows the consistent regulation to CESR in Europe that
the prearranged collusive trading is wash trade and shall be
strictly prohibited. Although clearly defined the wash trade
activity, the regulators (FCA, CESR, and CFTC) do not
provide any quantitative approach on detecting such activities.
As illustrated by the example in Table II, the simplest format
of wash trade is the simultaneous submission of two opposite
limit orders with identical price (125 in Table II) and similar
TABLE II
BASIC FORMAT OF WASH TRADE
TABLE III
WASH TRADE WITH MULTIPLE ORDERS
TABLE IV
WASH TRADE WITH MULTIPLE TRADERS
volume (495 in Table II) from one trader A. By the matching
rules, orders #01 and #02 match and 495 shares are executed
immediately after the submission. In addition, the wash trade
actions can also be carried out by multiple orders and traders
as the example formats, as shown in Tables III and IV.
In Table III, order #03 is matched and executed with
#01 and #02 sequentially so that a transaction of 490 shares
can be artificially created by trader A. In Table IV, two
transactions are created by four matched orders between
traders A and B. After the transactions (450 matched volumes),
there is almost no effective transfer of beneficial interest
among the two traders.
Summarizing the typical formats in Tables II and IV as
well as the definitions from the regulators, we obtain three
features of a successful execution of a wash trade manipulation
as follows.
1) Tight submission intervals between the matched buy and
sell orders (to minimize the risk of the orders being
unintentionally picked up by other traders).
2) Executable prices (to make the orders an immediate
execution).
3) Mostly matched volumes (to minimize the risk of
loss from the unmatched volumes executed with other
traders).
Perfect matching orders, which have the same price, volume
and submission time according to the summarized features,
guarantee the execution but are obviously easy to be suspected
as market abuse trade by the regulators. Therefore, to avoid
being easily detected, smart manipulators design the wash
trade orders to be mostly matched, such as the examples
in Tables II and IV, where around 99% volumes are executed,
respectively. Similarly, due to the matching rules in most
exchange markets [14], that is buy (sell) limit order matching
sell (buy) limit orders with the same price or lower (higher),
the limit prices in the examples in Table IV, which are
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different but executable, are also deliberately designed to
avoid inspection. In Table IV, order #02 can be executed with
order #01 at price 125, and order #04 can be executed with
order #03 at price 125.5. The 125 and 125.5 are the execution
prices of the two possible transactions; we refer to such prices
as transaction prices.
B. Wash Trade Detection
To the best of our knowledge, there is no related work on
the detection of wash trade activities in capital markets. The
only analogous research is work on the detection of collusive
cliques based on certain similar trading behaviors, which are
defined as the buy/sell activities of equities in a similar way.
A spectral clustering-based approach was developed [15],
where a trading-behavioral network is generated and any
behavior that deviates from the network is reported as an irreg-
ularity. The assumption of this paper is the strong consistency
between trader’s current behaviors and his/her previous trading
network. A graph clustering algorithm for detecting a set of
collusive traders has been proposed in [16]. The relationship
between traders is constructed as a stock flow graph, and those
with heavy trading within their network are clustered as a
collusion set.
A new trading collusion detection approach, the correlation
matrix of one trading day, was presented in [17], where the
trader behavior was represented by an aggregated time series
of signed volumes of submitted orders. The similarities of
behaviors among multiple traders are measured by Pearson’s
product-moment coefficient, and the cliques with a coefficient
higher than a user-specified threshold were considered as
suspicious collusions. The experiments of this study evaluated
the real order data of futures traded in the Shanghai Futures
Exchange. The signed order volume is constructed by vol-
umes and directions (buy/sell) of the order. The order price
information is ignored according to the assumption that the
order prices are not related to the trader’s behaviors [17].
However, the market impact measure shows that the order
price significantly impacts the market [18] so that the market
moves caused by the traders’ own actions (orders) become
the principal part of the transaction costs [19]. It is, therefore,
unacceptable to ignore the order price information, which not
only distinguishes traders’ intention, but is a key feature of
wash trade manipulation tactics.
A technique developed by the CME to prevent wash trades
at the engine level was rolled out in the middle of 2011 [20]
and updated in the summer of 2013 [14]. However, it
only monitored the same-priced buy/sell orders from trading
accounts with the same beneficial ownership [14] (example
in Table II). The lack of the surveillance mechanisms for wash
trades with multiple orders or traders (example illustrations
in Tables III and IV) left it possible for collusive parties to
create a number of transactions that give a false appearance
of large trading volumes.
In December 2012, a wash trade case was manu-
ally inspected and documented by the Securities and
Exchange Commission of Pakistan [21]. In March 2013, the
U.S. regulators started to investigate traders acting as both
buyer and seller in the same transactions and reported that
several hundred potential wash trades occur each day on CME
and Intercontinental Exchange [20]. In June 2012, the
Hong Kong financial regulator claimed that the attempts of
entering wash trade or matched trade were financial manipu-
lation crimes whether or not the wash trade or matched trade in
fact has, or is likely to have, the effect of misleading appear-
ance [22]. This ruling was also accepted by Rule 575 [13]
and the Market Abuse Directive II [23]. This rule provided an
aggressive restriction: any attempts of wash trade or matched
trade are financial crimes.
To date, academic research has mainly focused on detecting
the overall trading collusions according to defined analogous
behaviors. The detection of mass market behaviors can hardly
reach a precise and determinable manipulation detection result,
but it can show a collective correlation of trading activities
among different trader clusters. Industry techniques merely
covered the simple format of wash trade scenarios. A slightly
improved manipulation tactic can bypass the wash trade
monitoring. However, no efforts appear to have been made in
the analysis of wash trade strategic behavior or the design of a
detection approach identifying any tactics of attempts of wash
trade. Given the gap in the field, it is this aspect of market
manipulation that this paper seeks to address. This paper
proposes a wash trade detection algorithm that monitors all
incoming limit orders that can possibly attempt to compose a
wash trade. Recognizing such attempts helps the regulators to
prevent market abuse by a strict regulation.
III. WASH TRADE DETECTION METHODOLOGY
A. Analysis Terminologies
To analyze the wash trade strategic behaviors, the definitions
and terminologies in [24] are adopted and revised to formalize
the trading properties and market changes. The effect of wash
trade can be represented by the position of the whole trading
collusion, where position is the amount of equities held by
a trader. As the wash trade is merely fraudulent activities
rather than true trading actions, each participated trader tends
to maintain his own positions unchanged for minimizing the
unnecessary financial loss, and therefore, the position of the
whole wash trade collusive group is also not changed. During
the wash trade process, the position change is caused by a
number of orders from the trader in the collusive group and
can be defined as
Position + Orders → Position.
Position is comprised of a sequence of orders
Position = {(Order1), (Order2) . . . (Ordern)}
where each order is defined as
Order = (Trader_ID, Type, Price, Volume)
where Type = buy | sell. Representing the order Type buy and
sell by positive and negative signs, respectively, and affixing
the sign to the Trader_ID and Volume, a sell order can be
represented as
Order = (−Trader_ID, Price,−Volume). (1)
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By this, the orders in Table IV can be illustrated as
Position = {(A, 125, 500), (−B, 124.2,−450)
(B, 125.5, 450), (−A, 125,−500)}.
The buy/sell orders having matched prices can be merged as
Position = {(A − B, 125, 500 − 450 = 50)
(B − A, 125.5, 450 − 500 = −50)}.
As discussed in Section II-A, prices 125 and 125.5 are
represented as transaction prices. The difference between
the executable limit prices is calculated as the margins of
the transaction prices. In this case, the transaction price
125 has the margin 125 − 124.2 = 0.8, and the transaction
price 125.5 has the margin 125.5 − 125 = 0.5. We merge
the potential transactions who price margins are overlapped,
i.e., 125 + 0.8 and 125.5 + 0.5 are overlapped. After the
merge, we rerepresent the positions, i.e., the margin between
124.2 and 125.5 is represented as: 124.85 ± 0.65
Position = {A − B + B − A, 124.85 ± 0.65, 50 − 50}
= {“0,” 124.85 ± 0.65, 0}
where the Trader_ID calculation is carried out as a symbolic
operation, and 0.65 is represented as the transaction margin δT
and 124.85 is the transaction price PT . The zero-valued signed
trader ID implies that each collusive trader transacts at both
sides (buy and sell) of the market and the zero signed volume
indicates the total amounts of the transactions in both sides
are zero. No equity is really bought or sold. Therefore, the
unchanged position, represented through zero-valued signed
trader ID and signed volume, indicates the wash trade activities
in certain collusion.
B. Wash Trade Among Multiple Traders
As the FCA and CESR pointed out in their consultation
reports [11], [12], it is difficult to distinguish a wash
trade, because the format of trading collusions varies
and the collusive transactions can be buried in the mass
numbers of normal trading activities, such as the complex
network reported by NANEX on May 31, 2013 [25],
where vertices illustrate traders and directional connections
among vertices represent the transaction between traders.
We utilize this idea in [25] and represent submitted limit
orders (from a number of traders) by a graph, where
vertices represent traders, and the short arrows affixed to
the vertex represent the orders submitted by the trader
(buying and the selling orders are represented by arrows
pointing inward and outward, respectively) and the
dotted arrow lines represent the possible executed orders
according to the matching rule discussed in Section II-A.
An example of wash trade action mixed up with legitimate
trading orders is shown in Table V and illustrated by the
graph in Fig. 1. Among the 14 orders submitted by 6 traders
in this example, four pairs (#1–#4 in Table V) of wash trade
orders are deliberately submitted by four traders with tight
submission intervals, executable prices, and mostly matched
volumes so that the orders in each pair are suspiciously easy
TABLE V
EXAMPLE OF WASH TRADE IN A SEQUENCE OF LIMIT
ORDERS FROM A NUMBER OF TRADERS
Fig. 1. Closed connection cycle of traders and the possible execution flow
along the cycle in wash trade action (14 orders in Table V are mapped to
the graph).
to match and execute. In Fig. 1, the possible executions of
the orders are illustrated by four dotted arrow lines: each
dotted arrow line connecting one pair of matched orders,
and the arrowhead indicating the transaction direction of
the financial equity, i.e., A pointing to B means trader A
sells shares of equity to trader B. From the illustration
in Fig. 1, when participating wash trade activities, traders
(A, B, C, and D) connect as a closed simple cycle
(dotted arrow lines) and continuous transactions among the
traders flow throughout the cycle in one single direction
(either clockwise or counterclockwise) with each trader
along the pathway passing the parcel [26]. After a complete
transaction loop, the beneficial interest has been transferred
across the collusive group, and no traders in the group have
an actual position change.
The no beneficial interest change of all collusive traders in
wash trade activities can also be calculated by the terminolo-
gies defined in Section III-A as (2).
Equation (2) shows the possible execution [dotted arrow
line (1) in Fig. 1] of two orders in pair #1 in Table V
due to the matching rule, execution occurring on earliest
orders with matched prices, as discussed in Section II-A.
Similarly, the executions of matched pairs #2–#4 in Table V
[dotted arrow lines (2)–(4) in Fig. 1] are represented by (2).
The aggregated results of those executions are calculated
in (2), where 50 shares of volumes are remained due to
the mostly matched volumes tactic between any two smart
manipulator neighbors to avoid regulatory inspections [26].
The unmatched volumes (for example, 2%) can then be defined
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TABLE VI
EXAMPLE OF MATCHED PAIR COMPOSED OF MULTIPLE
ORDERS IN WASH TRADE ACTIVITY
as the matching margin (δv). Similarly, the differences between
the limit order prices and the transaction prices can be defined
as the limit price margin (δp) and the transaction margin (δTp ),
respectively. In the following case, δTp = 0.005 :
Position = {(−A, 125.00,−1450), (B, 125.01, 1500)
(−B, 124.95,−1500), (C, 125.01, 1450)
(−C, 125.00,−1450), (D, 125.01, 1500)
(−D, 125.01,−1450), (A, 125.01, 1450)}
= {(−A + B, 125.00 + 0.01,+50)
(−B + C, 124.95 + 0.06,−50)
(−C + D, 125.00 + 0.01,+50)
(−D + A, 125.01 + 0, 0)}
= {‘ − A + B − B + C − C + D − D + A′
124.95 + 0.06, 50 − 50 + 50 + 0}
= {‘0’, 125.005 ± 0.005,+50}. (2)
Furthermore, as shown in Table V, the time intervals
between different pairs can vary as random events occurred in
one single trading day. To avoid being detected as suspiciously
trading action, in practice, smart manipulators tactically place
the pairs at separated time points as the examples in Table V,
where the time differences among any two pairs are completely
different and random. To achieve this, manipulators carefully
design each pair of matched orders to minimize the possible
financial loss from price changes in the time period (i.e., from
9:00 to 10:50 in Table V) and to maintain the positions of
their whole collusive group at zero. The separated arrangement
of the matched pairs increases the complexity of detecting a
wash trade under a mixture environment of both normal and
manipulative trades.
Additional to the example in Table V and Fig. 1, the
matched pairs among any two manipulators can also be
constructed by a number of limit orders, as shown in Table III,
rather than simply matched one-to-one sell and buy orders
(as the pairs in Table V). For example, the matched pair #1
in Table V can be constituted by four selling orders and one
buying orders, as shown in Table VI and Fig. 2.
In the examples, the submission of four sell orders is
followed tightly by one large buy order, which matches,
potentially executes, and removes all (or most) volumes of
previous four sell orders. The graph of the traders and the
transaction flow are revised in Fig. 2, where the #1 matched
pair between A and B is illustrated by four short outward
arrows affixed to A connecting with one short inward arrows
affixed to B through the dotted arrow and other parts of the
structure of the whole closed cycle of the traders is remained.
Fig. 2. Multiple matched orders between two manipulators in wash trade
action (14 orders in Table V and 5 orders in Table VI are mapped into
the graph).
In the example in Table VI, since the buy order #05 is
submitted later than the sell orders, it will be executed at the
prices of four sell orders, i.e., order #05 will be first executed
as 450 shares at 124.99 with order #01, and then, another
450 shares executed at 124.98 with order #02 and so on.
C. Wash Trade Features
From the discussion in Sections III-A and III-B, the strategy
that constructs a wash trade activity has the following two key
features.
Feature 1: Matched orders—as the first step of wash trade
manipulation, traders deliberately submit the matched orders
to the market in tiny time intervals to guarantee the execution;
those orders can be one-to-one (examples in Table V) or
one-to-many matched (example in Table VI); this feature refers
to dotted arrow lines in Figs. 1 and 2.
Feature 2: Closed transaction cycle—any single execution
of the matched orders does not refer to a wash trade manip-
ulation unless those executions constitute a closed cycle as
illustrated in the examples shown in Figs. 1 and 2; this feature
refers to closed cycle of dotted arrows among the traders
in Figs. 1 and 2.
Considering the example in Table V, the manipulators set
up the matched orders from the #01 order at time 9:00:000,
but the wash trade is not completely constructed until the
submission of the #12 order at time 10:50:001, which closes
the transaction cycle. Therefore, a wash trade can be detected
through detecting the matched orders and closed cycle in
two steps.
Step 1: Detect the suspiciously matched order pairs S
according to the matching rule and wash trade features, tight
submission intervals, executable prices, and mostly matched
volumes
Order Pair = {∑ Orders} = { + Tm − Tn, PT ±δTp ,±δv
}
where +Tm − Tn represents trader Tn selling shares of equity
to Tm and δv and δTp represent the matching margin of volume
and transaction price PT.
Step 2: Among S, find the order pairs whose transaction
price margins are overlapped, in those pairs, if some pairs
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fulfill the condition
Position =
{
∑
k∈S
OrderPairk
}
= {“0,” PT ±δTp ,±δv
}
a wash trade alert is triggered.
To further formulate those features, we define the #k order L
submitted by trader Tn at time tk as
Lk = (tk,±Tn, Pk,±Vk)
where Pk and Vk are the #k order price and volume, respec-
tively, and the positive and negative signs ± represent buy and
sell operation. The matching margin δ is defined as a vector
δ = [δp, δt , δv ] with three small positive values for price, time,
and volume, respectively. If buy order #K is matched with
K−1 sell orders from #1 to #K−1, their features have the
following.
1) Tiny time interval
|t1 − tK| < δt . (3)
2) Executable tiny price difference
PK−min(P1, . . . , PK−1) < δp. (4)
3) Mostly matched volume
∣
∣
∣∣
∣
K−1∑
k=1
Vk − VK
∣
∣
∣∣
∣
< δv . (5)
If K orders among N traders construct wash trade action,
their features meet the following condition, where rnk is the
indicator that if order #k from trader Tn is a sell order, then
rnk = −1, and rnk = +1 for buy order:
Position =
{ N∑
n=1
rnk T n, PT ±δTp ,±δv
}
= {“0,” PT ±δTp ,±δv
}
. (6)
The features in (2)–(5) are detected in Step 1, and the feature
in (6) is detected in Step 2.
D. Problem Formulation
To discover the wash trade before it completely occurs
(fulfilling the recent regulations on preventing the attempts
of wash trade), the detection approach is applied to the limit
order streams instead of the trade records. The order stream is
the sequence of limit orders received by the trading platform
from numerous traders. The stream is updated by the order
event, which could be submission, modification, cancellation,
or execution. As shown in Table I, an order includes ID,
trader ID, time, buy/sell sign, price, and volume. In this paper,
we assume that the orders in the stream are on one specific
stock. Thus, the stock information in the stream can be ignored
once the specific stock is determined. This assumption, on
one hand, narrows the scope of this study specifically on
the underlying problem and, on the other hand, conforms the
practical trading platform environment, where the algorithm
can be easily applied to selected equity.
Step 1, detecting the suspiciously matched order pairs
according to (3)–(5), is termed coarse detection, while
Algorithm 1 Wash Trade Detection – Pre-Organization
WASH_TRADE_DETECT(Lk)
1 Qs= ∅; Qb= ∅
2 while Lk is a valid limit order
3 if Lk is buy
4 Push Lk into Qb
5 while Qblength > θT
6 Pop Qb,1 to maintain θT
7 else
8 Push Lk into Qs
9 while Qs length > θT
10 Pop Qs,1 to maintain θT
Step 2, recognizing the closed cycle based on (6), is termed
fine detection. The limit order stream is then required to be
preorganized to commence with those two tasks. A physical
time sliding window sized θT is specified, and the trading order
stream can be split into two queues of consecutive orders:
1) buy order queue, Qb and 2) sell order queue, Qs each
of which maintains a size θT . That is, if a new order Lk is
a buy order, push it into Qb; otherwise push it into Qs .
If the length of the updated queue is larger than θT , pop the
earliest orders to maintain the length of the sliding window.
The algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. Since the order
stream is measured in order event time, θT is maintained by
calculating the difference between the physical time stamps
of the first and the last orders in the queue. Hence, the
number of orders in each queue ultimately depends on the
underlying frequency of order activities and differs across time
(Algorithm 1 is named WASH_TRADE_DETECT, because it
will involve all detection subfunctions, which are discussed in
follow-up sections).
The intention of the wash trade, increasing transaction
volume, indicates that the wash trades are usually associ-
ated with large-sized orders. Consequently, the orders with
volumes smaller than a predefined threshold θV are ignored,
where the threshold can be set up according to the require-
ments of the detection solidness. Given the limit order
queues Qb and Qs , the coarse detection can then be formu-
lated as follows. For a large incoming order, examine in the
opposite order queue for one or multiple potential matching
orders, which are characterized by (3)–(5). The result of the
coarse detection comprises all order combinations matched
with the incoming order. Collusions may exist among those
combinations.
Similarly, the fine detection can be formulated as follows.
Given the matched order pairs, find certain sets of pairs in
which the sum of signed trader ID and signed volume have
zero values as the illustrations in (6). Defining coarse detection
and fine detection as the function COARSE_DETECT and
FINE_DETECT, respectively, the wash trade detection is
further designed in Section III-E.
E. Coarse Detection—Matching Search
The matching relationship of wash trade order pairs is
summarized in (3)–(5). In the coarse detection process, three
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Algorithm 2 Wash Trade Detection Algorithm
WASH_TRADE_DETECT(Lk)
1 Qs = ∅; Qb = ∅; {Matched Pairs} = ∅;
2 while Lk is a valid limit order
3 if Lk is buy
4 Push Lk into Qb
5 while Qb length > θT
6 Pop Qb,1;
7 {MP}= COARSE_DETECT(Qs , Lk);
8 else
9 Push Lk into Qs
10 while Qs length > θT
11 Pop Qs,1;
12 {MP}= COARSE_DETECT (Qb, Lk);
13 if {MP} = ∅
14 FINE_DETECT({MP});
Fig. 3. Coarse detection scheme.
conditions are sequentially checked to identify the potential
matching.
The time matching margin δt in (3) shows the tiny interval
between the orders in a pair. Setting the length of the order
queue θT in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 1 equivalent to δt ,
the coarse detection is designed as the illustration in Fig. 3:
given the incoming order Lk , examining the opposite orders
in previous δt (θT ) period for potential matched orders, which
are determined by price and volume margin, δp and δv .
Algorithm 1 is then revised as Algorithm 2, which includes
both the COARSE_DETECT and FINE_DETECT func-
tions, where the {MP} is the detected matched pairs of
COARSE_DETECT.
In financial markets, only the orders following executable
price rules [14] match and execute. Therefore, the price
margin δp in (4) is constrained by the following rules.
Rule 1: Sell order matches buy orders with equal or higher
prices.
Rule 2: Buy order matches sell orders with equal or lower
prices.
The example in Table VI, where the #5 buy order price is
slightly higher than all previous sell orders, shows Rule 2 of
price margin δp . Considering the price margin δp , the coarse
detection is designed as follows. Given the incoming buy
(sell) order Lk , among all executable orders (in terms of the
executable limit prices) in the previous δt (θT ) period, find the
order pairs having the best matching volumes.
The volume matching can be defined as a function
VOL_MATCH (Qt,p,Lk), where Qt,p is a set of orders
after being filtered by δt and δp . Given this,
COARSE_DETECT (Q, Lk) is defined in Algorithm 3,
Algorithm 3 Coarse Detection
COARSE_DETECT(Q, Lk)
1 Qt,p= ∅;
2 if Lk is a valid buy order
3 for each order Li in Q
4 if Pi <= Pk
5 push Li into Qt,p
6 else if Lk is a sell order
7 for each order Li in Q
8 if Pi >= Pk
9 push Li into Qt,p
10 if Qt,p = ∅
11 S = VOL_MATCH(Qt,p, Lk)
where Q contains all opposite orders in the previous δt periods
and Lk is the incoming order. Based on the above discussions
and the constraints in (5), the function VOL_MATCH
(Qt,p, Lk) is defined as follows: given incoming order Lk
and a set of matched orders Qt,p , find subsets S of the order
pairs from Qt,p such that
∣
∣∣
∣
∣
(
∑
i∈S
Vi
)
− Vk
∣
∣∣
∣
∣
≤ δv.
The number of limit orders in subset S is ns (ns is smaller than
the size of Qt,p). In essence, the problem of VOL_MATCH
is a practical case of a more general problem called the
knapsack problem [27]–[29]. The name knapsack refers to the
problem of filling a knapsack of capacity W using a subset
of m items {1, . . . , m}, each of which has a mass and a value,
such as the total weight of the selected items is less than
or equal W , and their total value is maximized. The volume
matching problem can be viewed as a simplified form of the
knapsack problem: given a capacity Vk (the knapsack size)
and a set Qt,p of items, each having nonnegative size Vi ,
find all possible subsets S of items to eventually make
∣
∣∣
∣
∣
(
∑
i∈S
Vi
)
− Vk
∣
∣∣
∣
∣
≤ δv.
Due to the similarity of the two problems, the widely
used approach solving the knapsack problem, dynamic pro-
gramming, is employed in VOL_MATCH (Qt,p, Lk). The
main principles of dynamic programming are that we have
to come up with a number of subproblems so that each
subproblem can be solved easily from smaller subproblems,
and the solution of the original problem can be obtained
easily once we know the solutions to all the subproblems [30].
Dynamic programming has been studied thoroughly in opti-
mization problems in [31] and [32].
To solve the special form of the knapsack problem under
N limit orders and volume Vk , denoting the final subset of
orders in an optimum solution for the original problem as SN ,
we then use the notation OPT (N, Vk) to denote the sum
of the order volumes of the first N orders in the subset S
under the constraint |OPT (N, Vk )−Vk| ≤ δv. The sum in the
first N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1 orders can then be represented
as OPT (N − 1, Vk), OPT (N − 2, Vk), . . . , OPT(1, Vk).
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To determine OPT (N, Vk ), we not only need the solution
of OPT (N − 1, Vk), but also need to know OPT (N − 1,
Vk − VN ), the best solution for the first N − 1 orders with the
remaining capacity Vk −VN , which constructs the constraint as
|OPT (N − 1, Vk) − (Vk − VN )| ≤ δv . The recursion can then
be summarized as follows: if L N is not one of the orders in
the final subset SN , we can ignore the order N and determine
OPT (N − 1, Vk); however, if L N is one of the orders, we
need to seek an optimal solution for the remaining orders,
1, . . . , N − 1, which is OPT (N − 1, Vk − VN ). Using this set
of subproblems, we are able to express the OPT (N, Vk) as a
simple expression in terms of values from smaller problems.
Therefore, the recursion is summarized as two conditions.
1) If Li /∈SN , then OPT (N, Vk ) = OPT(N−1,Vk).
2) If Li∈SN , then OPT (N, Vk) = VN +
OPT (N−1,Vk−Vk).
This recursive process is reorganized based on the above
two conditions to give Algorithm 4. This recursive algorithm
can be used by invoking OPT (N, Vk ) for N limit orders and
the capacity Vk .
F. Fine Detection—Collusion Search
SN , orders from Q matched with the incoming order Lk ,
is the result of the coarse detection. To further detect the
potential closed cycle of transactions, the orders in SN are
represented by (1), where the trader ID and the volumes
are affixed with trading direction signs. After the conversion,
SN is defined as ScN , the input of the fine detection algorithm
FINE_DETECT. As discussed in Section III-A and (2), the
order pairs with potential transaction prices with overlapped
price margins are grouped together for potential collusion
detection.
Detecting trader collusion is treated as discovering the
combinations C from SN such that the sum of the signed trader
equals zero as illustrated in (6). This process can be considered
equivalent to a special case of the previously defined volume
matching problem: given a capacity W = 0 (the knapsack
size) and a set of signed trader pairs, each having a value
(e.g., {+A} and {−A}), select all possible subsets C of signed
trader pairs are defined in Section A and can be implemented
by operator overloading. The subset C is considered as trading
collusion in a wash trade.
Algorithm 5, derived from Algorithm 4, provides the recur-
sive solution for FINE_DETECT (ScN ).
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
Evaluating a detection model usually relies on real data of
both normal and abuse cases. However, due to the limited
reports on wash trade manipulation and regulatory rules
prohibiting the disclosure of illegitimate market data, the
availability of the examples of wash trade behaviors in capital
markets is far less than the availability of routine normal
trading records. Therefore, to evaluate the proposed detec-
tion model, it is acceptable to the financial industry that
all the characteristic patterns of wash trade examples are
reproduced, and then injected into original trading records to
generate a mixed data set of normal and abuse cases [33].
Algorithm 4 Volume Matching Detection by Recursion
1 VOL_MATCH(Qt,p, Lk) // original limit order set Qt,p;
2 SN = ∅; // solution subset, initialized
to empty;
3 N = length (Qt,p); // N : size of Qt,p;
4 OPT (N,Lk) // N decreases on each
recursion step;
5 if N < 1 or |Lk | ≤ δv // if N reaches the last one
or δv condition is satisfied;
6 return;
7 if |VN − Lk | ≤ δv // if condition is satisfied,
then orders
8 output SN ; in SN is one solution;
9 push L N into SN // assume L N ∈SN ;
10 OPT
(
N − 1, VN − L N,v
) ; // recursively find solution
by condition 2;
11 Discard L N from SN // assume L N /∈SN ;
12 OPT
(
N−1,Lnv
) ; // recursively find solution
by condition 1;
13 end of OPT
14 return SN ;
Algorithm 5 Collusion Search by Recursion
1 FINE_DETECT
(
ScN
)
; // original signed trader set ScN
2
⇀
C= ∅; // solution subset, initialized to
empty;
3 N = length (ScN
)
; sum = 0; // N: size of ScN ;
4 OPT (N, sum) // N decreases on each recursion
step;
5 if N< 1 // if N reaches the last one, done
6 return;
7 if rT + sum = 0 // if the sum of signed trader
including current one is zero
8 output
⇀
C; // the signed trader in ScN is
a solution;
9 push rT into
⇀
C; // assume ⇀t N ∈
⇀
C;
10 OPT (N−1, sum + rT) ; // recursively find solution
by condition 2;
11 Discard rT from
⇀
C; // assume ⇀t N /∈
⇀
C;
12 OPT (N−1, sum) ; // recursively find solution
by condition 1;
13 end of OPT
14 return
⇀
C;
Randomly synthesized exploratory manipulation cases can
mimic any possibility of wash trade scenarios, i.e., we can
generate the matched order at any time with any volume
size as well as matching margins. Synthetic exploratory
financial data are also accepted in academia for evaluating
the proposed model when real market data are hard to
collect [15], [16], [34]. In this paper, the experimental evalu-
ation is composed of two parts.
Part 1: Experimental evaluation using original trading data
sets from the market.
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Part 2: Experimental evaluation using original trading data
sets injected with synthetically generated wash trade scenarios
following the analysis in Section II-A.
A. Experiment Setup
The experimental data used in this paper involve real
market data (trading orders) of seven stocks: Google (GOOG),
Microsoft (MSFT), and Apple (AAPL) from NASDAQ,
and First Quantum Minerals (FQM), Yamana Gold (YAU),
Gazprom (OGZD), and Vodafone (VOD) from London Stock
Exchange (LSE). The selection of these data sets is due to their
active trading activities, relatively high trading volumes and
more volatile price fluctuation, the factors that might increase
the likelihood of market abuse across the exchanges [8], [35].
The data sets from NASDAQ cover messages over five trading
days from June 11–15, 2012, and consist of more than
400 000 trading orders in total for each stock. The data sets
from LSE cover May 23–27, 2011, and consist of more
than 100 000 orders in total for each stock. Table I shows
an excerpt of the trading records used in this paper. The
wash trade detection algorithms are evaluated on the original
seven data sets for detecting any transactions, which are
suspiciously similar to wash trade manipulation. In addition,
the typical wash trade activities are reproduced according to
the discussions and examples in Tables V and VI and injected
into those seven data sets for further experimental evaluations.
B. Determining the Marginal Parameters
As discussed in Section II-A, the submissions of the
matched orders in a wash trade are usually within tiny time
intervals δt so that the manipulated execution can compete
against the action of normal traders who may pick the orders
unintentionally [11], [14]. Consequently, the normal execution
time shows a reasonable reference to the time interval δt ,
which otherwise is not available because of the lack of the
statistical studies of the real wash trade cases.
Usually, the execution time of a limit order is strongly
associated with its volume [8], [18], [36]. Therefore, a more
reasonable measure of the average execution time of normal
limit orders can be given by volume-weighted average execu-
tion time (VWAT), defined as
TVWAT =
∑
j (Tj ∗ v j )∑
j v j
(7)
where TVWAT is the volume-weighted average execution time,
Tj is the execution time of order j , v j is the volume of
order j , and j is each individual order [36]. In practice, if the
wash trade orders are submitted with time intervals larger than
TVWAT, they are apparently easy to pick by other legitimate
traders. Accordingly, by setting δt = TVWAT, this approach
covers a time period for all possible wash trade activities. The
order execution time Tj and TVWAT across the seven stocks in
the test data set are calculated and summarized in Table VII.
Theoretically, the wash trade can be carried out by a large
number of small orders. However, in practice, the wash trade
orders are usually larger than the average volume of the
normal trading orders, because a large number of orders can
significantly increase the uncertainty of the order executions,
TABLE VII
VWAT AND AVERAGE VOLUME
TABLE VIII
EXPERIMENT RESULTS (FNR) ACROSS ORIGINAL
DATA SETS OF SEVEN STOCKS
which may bring a risk of loss if it does not follow the
expected arrangements. Therefore, the average order volume of
each stock is selected as the threshold θV for the order volume
filtering discussed in Section IV-D. The average volume across
seven stocks is also calculated and summarized in Table VII.
In addition, the volume matching margin δv is selected
as percentages: 0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% indicating
the ratio of not matching (1% refers identifying orders with
99% matching volumes). In the example, in Table VI, the
#5 buy order volume (1500 shares) is ∼96.7% matched with
all previous sell orders (1450 shares). The price margin δp is
unconstrained in the detection so that any orders following the
price matching rules Rules 1 and 2 are scanned for possible
matching pairs under the condition in (5).
Under the configurations of δt , θV , δv , and δp, Algorithm 4
reflects the fact that given an order Lk , among all executable
priced orders (unconstrained δp but following Rules 1 and
2) with volume not smaller than θV in a previous δt time
period, find the matched orders that executed at least (1−δv)%
volumes of Lk .
C. Part 1: Experiments on Original Datasets
In Part 1 experiment, the wash trade detection algorithm is
evaluated on the original seven data sets using the parameters
in Section IV-B. The evaluation shows the applicability of the
proposed algorithms to real transaction data and also examines
the legitimacy of the transactions in original data set. Since
the original data sets do not contain any reported wash trade
manipulation activities, it is assumed to only contain legitimate
transactions. Thus, the evaluation measure is based on false
negative rate (FNR) = (FN/FN + TP), which is based on false
negative (FN), defined as normal cases detected as a wash
trade, and true positive (TP), defined as normal cases detected
as normal.
The results of the experiments (max FNR values on each
stock data set are highlighted) are shown in Table VIII. It is
clear that in each data set, some transactions are detected as
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TABLE IX
FALSE NEGATIVE CASES OF STOCK AAPL
suspicious wash trade actions, and the numbers of the detected
actions increase across the increases of volume margins. Most
of the data sets do not contain any suspicious actions when
the volume margin is set to 0%, and the Apple stock shows
the highest FNR rate (1.263%) at the 5% volume margin.
With careful inspection and consultation with the financial
industry experts, we determined that the detected FN cases
show very similar features to the wash trade actions although
not reported by the regulators. The detected FN cases fall into
two formats, as shown in Table IX.
In case #1, the trader Client12 sold 6600 shares to Client3 at
price 58.0 and bought 6606 back 2 s later at the same price.
The 99.9% matched transacted volumes, the 100% matched
prices, and the closed cycle of the transaction directions
between Client12 and Client3 make this case extremely
suspicious and potentially be a wash trade action according
to the regulation [9] although not reported yet. Detecting such
suspicious activities shows the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithms, although recognizing the real intention behind such
cases requires more inspections from the regulators, which
is out of the scope of our work. In case #2, Client1 sold
15 000 shares to Client5 at price 58.56 at market closing time
and bought them all back at slightly higher price at market
opening time on the next day. Those transactions also fulfill
the conditions of a wash trade action except the trading dates.
According to the suggestions from financial experts, case #2
refers to prearranged trading, which is defined as a sell is
coupled with a buy back at the same or prearranged price that
limits the risks [9]. The only difference between prearranged
trading and wash trade is that the former is usually among
merely two parties and may occur in different days and the
latter can involve a number of collusive traders and usually
occurs as intraday trading. When only targeting wash trade, the
proposed algorithms can be applied on intraday transactions to
avoid picking up the prearranged trading as case #2, although
the prearranged trading is also illegal [9] and needs to be
monitored and banned from the capital markets.
D. Part 2: Experiments on Data Sets With
Injected Wash Trade
Testing with synthetic data can mimic any possible wash
trade cases and can also evaluate the robustness of the pro-
posed algorithms under any wash trade scenarios, i.e., random
combinations of one or multiple traders wash trade activities.
1) Wash Trade Case Generation: The typical wash trade
activities are reproduced and injected in each stock data set.
The activities are reproduced in two format groups:
Group 1: One order matched with single opposite order,
termed single-matching.
TABLE X
GENERATED SINGLE MATCHED WASH TRADE CASES (δv = 5%)
TABLE XI
GENERATED MULTIPLE MATCHED WASH TRADE CASES (δv = 5%)
Group 2: One order matched with multiple opposite orders,
termed multimatching.
Each group contains three different sets according to trader
numbers in the wash trade collusion: 1) set #1 has examples
with one trader in a trading collusion and 2) sets #2 and #3
have two and four traders in a trading collusion. To ensure
a comprehensive assessment of the approach, in each set,
volume matching margin δv is selected as a percentage of 0%,
1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5% indicating the ratio of not matching
(1% indicating the orders from two sides are 99% matching).
There are ten examples for each combination of the above
parameters.
The examples in Tables X and XI show an excerpt of
the generated wash trade cases: 1) case #1: two traders with
5% single matched volumes; 2) case #2: four traders with
5% single matched volumes; and 3) case #3: two traders
with 5% multiple matched volumes. The volume, time, and
matching margin of the synthetic orders are all randomly
generated. For example, in case 3 in Table XI, buy order
volume vb in pair 1 is randomly generated (under condition:
vb ≥ θV ), and all sell orders in pair 1 are also randomly
generated under the condition that volume sum Vs of all sell
orders satisfies: vb ∗ (1− δv) ≤ Vs ≤ vb . The time of orders in
pair 2 is also randomly generated as long as they are much later
than the time of pair 1. Similarly, the prices of order in each
pairs are randomly generated following the price matching
rules discussed in Section III-E. Similar to the examples in
Table VI, two order pairs in Table XI have different transaction
prices. The buy order in pair #1 in Table XI will be executed
with the previous four sell orders at 58, 58.01, 58.02, and
58.03, respectively. Therefore, the generated examples have
different transaction prices within transaction margins.
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Such random generation of synthetic cases provides the
possibility of thorough evaluation of the proposed algorithms
using any possible wash trade cases.
As discussed before, the models are tested on seven real
stocks, each of which contains two groups of injected exam-
ples. Each group has three sets (one, two, and four traders),
and each set contains six margin configurations. Under each
configuration, there are ten examples. There are overall
7 × 2 × 3 × 6 × 10 = 2520 different experiments carried out
as a robust evaluation plan for the proposed detection model.
The generated wash trade orders are then injected into
the data of corresponding stocks making the test data a
mixture of both normal and abuse patterns. The time intervals
between different pairs are selected randomly as examples
in Tables X and XI. For example, in case #1 in Table X,
the time of pair 2 is randomly selected after the pair 1 occurs.
In addition, the generated orders in each pair are separated
by several normal orders in original data sets to mimic the
practical case in the markets. This is a practical approach
to simulate how these wash trade scenarios occur in the real
world [37].
2) Performance Evaluation Metrics: The performance eval-
uation of the proposed model is based on two popular statisti-
cal measures: 1) sensitivity (SEN) and 2) specificity (SPE).
Both of them are based on the confusion matrix, where a
false positive (FP) is defined as a wash trade case detected as
normal; a true negative (TN) is defined as a wash trade case
detected as wash trade, and an FN and a TP that are defined
in Section IV-C. The SEN, defined as SEN = TP/(TP + FN),
represents the rate of correctly detecting normal trading orders
(also known as the TP rate), while the SPE, defined as
SPE = TN/(FP + TN), refers to the rate of correctly detecting
wash trade cases (also known as the TN rate).
3) Experimental Results: The experimental evaluations
across seven stocks are summarized in Fig. 4, where the
average SEN and SPE values across different numbers of
traders are illustrated against the margin values.
From Fig. 4, the SPE values for single matching show
that the algorithm completely detects the single-matching
cases, which is the simplest wash trade format and is appar-
ently easy to detect. The SPE values for multimatching vary
across the margins and the different stocks as the illustrations
in Fig. 4.
The SPE values increase with the increase of the margins
and approach 100% when the margin is higher than 5%. The
result conforms to the design expectation of the detection
approach. More possible collusions will be detected under
bigger matching margins. As discussed in Section II-A, mostly
matched (for example, 98%) orders might be built by smart
manipulators for standing aside from the inspections. A big
marginal value compensates this smart tactic, and the config-
urability of the margin increases the practicability of the model
in a real trading context.
The SEN values show more volatile results across the
margins. In most experiments, the SEN values reduce as the
margin increases indicating more normal activities incorrectly
detected as wash trade cases. On the contrary, the highest SEN
value appears at the zero margin value.
Fig. 4. Experiment results across seven stock data sets.
From the experimental results, it can be concluded that the
proposed approach detects the primary wash trade scenarios
effectively and consistently across the selected stocks with
SEN values in a range of 97%–100%.
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V. CONCLUSION
A wash trade activity detection approach is proposed after
thoroughly studying the various scenarios of wash trade behav-
iors. The analysis of the collusive activities in wash trades
through a graph of traders with transactions represented by
the directed connections among the vertexes shows the basic
structure of the collusion among multiple traders following a
closed cycle of the transactions among certain traders. Further
studies also show that the limit orders in wash trades are
usually submitted fast with mutually executed prices and
matched volumes. According to the analyzed features, the
proposed method is then split into steps defined separately
in Algorithms 4 and 5.
There are two major innovations in the proposed method as
follows.
1) Graph theory has been used to represent and model
the collusive relationships of the traders in wash trade
activities. The concluded fundamental structure of the
closed-cycle structure within a trader graph simplifies
the detection from the complexity of the collusive
networks.
2) The wash trade order detection has been approached as
a knapsack problem, which can be solved in two steps
by the traditional dynamic programming approaches.
Instead of only detecting the same-priced buy/sell orders in
the engine level detection mechanism in CME, the proposed
method determines the wash trade activities by considering
the suspicious matched orders as well as the collusive groups,
which are according to the trading activities in a certain time
period rather than a tiny time interval in real-time detection.
Therefore, the proposed approach best suits overnight detec-
tion in real financial world. However, the rapidly growing
trading frequency challenges detection mechanisms and hence
implementing the proposed approach in real time in a compu-
tationally efficient way will be the focus of future work.
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